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Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is the tendency for relations between groups
to be more competitive than relations between individuals. We examined whether
the discontinuity effect arises in part because group members experience normative
pressure to favor the ingroup (parochialism). Building on the notion that accountability
enhances normative pressure, we hypothesized that the discontinuity effect would
be larger when accountability is present (compared to absent). A prisoner’s
dilemma game experiment supported this prediction. Specifically, intergroup (compared
to interindividual) interaction activated an injunctive ingroup-favoring norm, and
accountability enhanced the influence of this norm on competitive behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity refers to the tendency for relations between groups to
be more competitive or less cooperative than relations between individuals (Insko et al., 2001,
2005, 2013). Most research comparing interindividual and intergroup interactions has done so in
the context of experiments with mixed-motive matrix games, like the prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG). The PDG involves the interaction between two players who can each select a cooperative
or competitive choice.1 Each player’s outcomes are determined by the combination of both players’
choices. Each player can maximize his/her outcomes by selecting the competitive choice, regardless
of the choice selected by the other player. Yet, paradoxically, when both select the competitive
choice, they achieve lower outcomes than they could have achieved by mutual cooperation.
Most PDG experiments contrasting interindividual and intergroup interactions have supported
the discontinuity eﬀect: interacting groups are more competitive than are interacting individuals
(Wildschut et al., 2003). Although the discontinuity eﬀect has been studied predominantly in
a PDG context involving participants from individualistic cultures (e.g., US, The Netherlands;
Wildschut et al., 2001), it has also been documented in non-laboratory contexts (Pemberton et al.,
1996), among participants from a collectivistic culture (Japan; Takemura and Yuki, 2007), in a
distributive (i.e., zero-sum) multi-issue negotiation task (Loschelder and Trötschel, 2010), and in a
context where the PDG matrix was substituted by a functionally equivalent set of rules governing
the exchange of folded origami products (Schopler et al., 2001).
1In this article, we refer to the two PDG choices as cooperative choice and competitive choice, respectively. Elsewhere, the
competitive choice is also referred to as the non-cooperative choice or defection. The latter labels have the advantage of not
suggesting relativistic motivation or a concern with winning. However, we used the “competitive choice” label for ease of
exposition and to maintain consistency with previous work on the discontinuity eﬀect (e.g., Insko et al., 2013). By adopting
this terminology, we do not mean to suggest that the competitive choice necessarily reﬂects concern with winning.
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THE ROLE OF PAROCHIALISM IN
INTERINDIVIDUAL-INTERGROUP
The discontinuity eﬀect is a highly robust and multicausal
phenomenon (Wildschut et al., 2007). The ingroup-favoring-
norm explanation proposes that the discontinuity eﬀect arises
in part because interindividual and intergroup interactions are
governed by diﬀerent norms or moral codes (Cohen et al.,
2006; Wildschut and Insko, 2006). On the one hand, norms
for interindividual interactions emphasize fairness (Thibaut and
Walker, 1975) and reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960)—a set of rules
referred to as individual morality (Cohen et al., 2010). On
the other hand, norms for intergroup interactions impel group
members to support the ingroup at the expense of outsiders—
a set of rules referred to as group morality or parochialism
(Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, 1991; Baron, 2001; Wildschut and
Insko, 2007).
Historical Background
The concept of parochialism dates back millennia. In Plato’s
(1891, p. 7) The Republic, Polemarchus defends the maxim of
classical Greekmorality that “justice is the art which gives good to
friends and evil to enemies.” Machiavelli (1515/1952) addressed a
similar message to aspiring leaders:
And yet he must not mind incurring the scandal of those vices,
without which it would be diﬃcult to save the state, for if
one considers well, it will be found that some things which
seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one’s ruin, and some
others which appear vices result in one’s greater security and
well-being (p. 93).
Hobbes (1660/1983) captured the essence of this idea in a few
simple words. “Force and fraud” he wrote, “are in war the two
cardinal virtues.” More recently, the theologian Niebuhr (1941)
expressed a related viewpoint when he wrote:
The group is more arrogant, hypocritical, self-centered and
more ruthless in the pursuit of its ends than the individual.
An inevitable moral tension between individual and group
morality is therefore created. . . . This tension is naturally most
apparent in the conscience of the responsible statesmen, who
are bound to feel the disparity between the canons of ordinary
morality and the accepted habits of collective and political
behavior (p. 222).
Early social psychological perspectives on group behavior also
showed a keen awareness of group morality or parochialism. For
example, Le Bon (1895/1896) wrote:
Taking the word “morality” to mean constant respect for
certain social conventions, and the permanent repression
of selﬁsh impulses, it is quite evident that crowds are
too impulsive and too mobile to be moral. If, however,
we include in the term morality the transitory display
of certain qualities such as self-abnegation, self-sacriﬁce,
disinterestedness, devotion, and the need of equity, we may
say, on the contrary, that crowds may at times exhibit a very
lofty morality (p. 43).
In a similar vein, McDougall (1920) observed:
The group spirit secures that the egoistic and the altruistic
tendencies of each man’s nature, instead of being in perpetual
conﬂict, as they must be in its absence, shall harmoniously co-
operate and re-enforce one another throughout a large part of
the total ﬁeld of human activity (p. 79).
Although inﬂuential in the very early days of social
psychology, Le Bon’s (1895/1896) and McDougall’s (1920) ideas
fell by the wayside after the centerpiece of their analysis—
the group mind concept—was criticized by Allport (1924).
As illustrated by this Research Topic, however, parochialism
has recently attracted revived interest from across the social
sciences (Wildschut et al., 2002; Choi and Bowles, 2007; De
Dreu et al., 2014; Rusch, 2014). In the present research, we
focus speciﬁcally on the contrast between norms governing
interindividual interactions and the dictates of parochialism.
According to the ingroup-favoring-norm explanation of the
discontinuity eﬀect, this contrast can shed light on the enduring
question of why relations between groups are more competitive,
hostile, and intractable than are relations between individuals.
Empirical Evidence
Initial tests of the ingroup-favoring-norm explanation were
guided by the notion that accountability enforces norms (Semin
and Manstead, 1983; Tetlock, 1992; Sedikides et al., 2002).
Broadly speaking, accountability is “the condition of being
answerable for conducting oneself in a manner that is consistent
with relevant prescriptions for how things should be” (Schlenker
andWeingold, 1989, p. 24). A corollary of the norm-enforcement
role of accountability is that ingroup-favoring norms should be
more inﬂuential when group members are accountable rather
than unaccountable to the ingroup. Only when group members
are accountable can their actions inﬂuence how the ingroup
evaluates them (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). An experiment
by Wildschut et al. (2002) supported this line of reasoning.
Participants were placed in separate rooms and informed that
they were part of a group that would interact with another group
located in an adjoining laboratory. They then made individual
PDG decisions under one of two conditions. In the public
condition, participants were told that, upon completion of the
experiment, they would meet the members of their ingroup to
discuss their decisions. In the private condition, they were told
that they would be dismissed separately from the laboratory.
Consistent with the ingroup-favoring-norm explanation, public-
condition participants (i.e., those accountable to the ingroup)
made more competitive choices than did private-condition
participants (i.e., those unaccountable to the ingroup). Pinter
et al. (2007) conceptually replicated this ﬁnding by demonstrating
that group leaders who were accountable to the ingroup made
more competitive PDG choices than did unaccountable group
leaders or individuals. Beyond the PDG context, Adams’s
(1976) boundary role theory has stimulated research aimed at
understanding how representatives react to constituent pressures
in the context of intergroup bargaining. Consistent with the
idea that representatives often assume that constituents expect
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them to be competitive toward other groups, research indicates
that accountable (compared to unaccountable) representatives
make fewer concessions, use more contentious tactics, and are
less likely to reach agreements (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993;
Druckman, 1994).
There is, then, compelling evidence that, when group
members are accountable to the ingroup, normative pressure
to support the ingroup can manifest as intergroup competition.
Yet, existing research is limited because it examined the
eﬀect of accountability on competitiveness in the context of
intergroup interactions only. The untested assumption is that,
because interindividual interactions are governed by norms of
fairness and reciprocity, accountability should not increase (and
might even reduce) competition between individuals, and thus
accentuate the discontinuity eﬀect. Accordingly, support for the
ingroup-favoring-norm explanation is incomplete. The primary
objective of the present research was to remedy this by testing
the eﬀect of accountability on competitiveness in the context of
intergroup and interindividual interactions.
ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERINDIVIDUAL
CONTEXT
The eﬀects of accountability on judgment and decision-making
in interindividual contexts have been equivocal (Lerner and
Tetlock, 1999). One strand of evidence supports the assumption
that interindividual interactions are governed by norms of
fairness and reciprocity, and, accordingly, that accountability
reduces competitive behavior (Reis and Gruzen, 1976; Prentice-
Dunn and Rogers, 1982). For instance, De Cremer et al.
(2001) demonstrated that, in a social dilemma task, individuals
who anticipated meeting their interaction partners were less
competitive than those who did not anticipate such a meeting,
suggesting that accountability (induced via anticipated future
interaction) increased the salience of fairness norms.
Another strand of evidence suggest, however, that
accountability may increase, rather than reduce, interindividual
competition. Miller (1999; Miller and Ratner, 1996) proposed
that, in individualistic cultures, self-interest is considered
normative and rational. This norm of self-interest is both
descriptive (i.e., relating to which behaviors are typically enacted)
and injunctive (i.e., relating to which behaviors are typically
approved or disapproved; Cialdini et al., 1990). It is descriptive
in the sense that individuals believe that others’ behavior is
guided by self-interest (Miller and Ratner, 1996, 1998) and it
is injunctive in the sense that individuals believe others do not
approve behavior that is divorced from self-interest (Ratner and
Miller, 2001). Thus, accountability could enforce the norm of
self-interest and attendant competition, at least in individualistic,
Western cultures.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The ingroup-favoring-norm explanation proposes that, whereas
intergroup interactions are guided by norms impelling group
members to favor the ingroup, interindividual interactions
activate norms emphasizing fairness and reciprocity. Because
accountability enforces norms (Tetlock, 1992), it should increase
intergroup competition and reduce interindividual competition.
This, in turn, entails a larger discontinuity eﬀect in the presence
(vs. absence) of accountability (Hypothesis 1). Speciﬁcally,
an intergroup (compared to interindividual) context should
render salient the ingroup-favoring norm, and accountability
will enhance the inﬂuence of this norm on competition
(Hypothesis 2). We did, however, also consider the alternative
possibility that accountability enforces the norm of self-
interest (rather than fairness and reciprocity) in interindividual
contexts, in which case it could increase (rather than reduce)
interindividual competition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Design
Two hundred thirty-six female University of Southampton
undergraduates took part in this experiment for partial course
credit or payment (£4.00). All participants earned an additional
£1.00 during the experiment. The experiment was reviewed and
approved by the University of Southampton Psychology Ethics
Committee. All participants provided written informed consent.
The design comprised two manipulated independent
variables: interaction type (individuals vs. groups) and
accountability (public vs. private responding). The interaction
type variable entailed a contrast between interactions involving
two isolated individuals with interactions involving two group
members who belonged to two separate three-person groups.
We manipulated accountability by informing participants in the
public condition that, upon completion of the experiment, they
would meet the two other participants seated on their side of the
laboratory (henceforth, same-side others) to discuss each other’s
decisions (accountability present). In the private condition, we
told participants that they would be dismissed separately and
that their decisions would remain anonymous (accountability
absent). In the intergroup condition, we informed participants
that the same-side others were part of their three-person group.
In the interindividual condition, we described the same-side
others as participants completing the same experiment.
Procedure
We ran the experimental sessions in a laboratory containing
six cubicles, with three cubicles located on opposite sides of
the room. In the interindividual condition, these cubicles were
numbered 1 through 6. In the intergroup condition, the three
cubicles on one side of the room were labeled A1 through A3
and the cubicles on the other side were labeled B1 through B3.
Each cubicle contained a desktop computer, a set of headphones,
and a web camera. Each participant was seated in a separate
cubicle. In the intergroup condition, we assigned participants to
groups (A or B) and informed them that the other members of
their group would be seated on the same side of the laboratory,
whereas the members of the other group would be seated on the
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other side of the laboratory. We omitted these instructions in the
interindividual condition.
Next, we explained the PDG matrix to participants. In the
interindividual condition, we informed participants that they
would interact with the person seated in the cubicle opposite
theirs and be allowed to keep the money they earned during
the experiment. We informed participants in the intergroup
condition that they would interact with the member of the
other group seated in the cubicle opposite theirs and that,
upon completion of the experiment, the three members of
their ingroup would share equally the money they had earned.
In the public condition, we informed participants that, upon
completion of the experiment, they would meet the same-side
others to talk about the decisions that they hadmade. (In fact, this
meeting did not occur and we dismissed participants separately.)
We informed participants in the private condition that they
would be dismissed separately and that their decisions would
remain anonymous. Subsequently, participants completed a brief
check of their understanding of the PDG and, if necessary, had
their answers corrected by the experimenter.
At this point, we told participants that they would interact
with the person in the opposite cubicle for one trial. This trial
proceeded as follows: participants had one minute to think about
the situation privately. After this 1-minute period, participants
opened an audio-visual connection with the person in the
opposite cubicle. Participants then had one minute to discuss
the situation with the person in the opposite cubicle, whom they
could hear through their headphones and see on their monitor.
Following this communication period, participants had one
minute to make their ﬁnal decision and record it in writing. After
participants recorded their decisions, the experimenter collected
the decisions and distributed a post-experimental questionnaire
with supplemental dependent variables. Finally, we paid all
participants a standard amount of £1.00 regardless of their
decisions. Debrieﬁng followed.
Dependent Variables
Manipulation Checks
To assess the eﬀectiveness of the accountability manipulation,
we asked participants: “Did you expect that the other persons
seated in the cubicles on your side of the room would ﬁnd
out what decision you made?” (0 = no, 1 = yes). Perceived
accountability should be higher with public (compared to private)
responding. As a check on the interaction-type manipulation,
we administered the following item: “Did you expect that every
person seated in the cubicles on your side of the room would
take home the same amount of money at the end of the study?”
(0 = no, 1 = yes). Perceived outcome interdependence should be
higher in the intergroup (compared to interindividual) condition.
Competitive Choice and Choice Reasons
The focal dependent variable was PDG choice behavior
(0 = cooperative, 1 = competitive). Because each of the two PDG
choices can be selected for a number of diﬀerent reasons (e.g.,
the cooperative choice may reﬂect a concern for maximizing
joint outcomes or a concern for achieving equal outcomes), we
also assessed participants’ choice reasons. Participants rated 20
items, each designed to measure one of the following reasons:
Max Own (e.g., “to earn as much as possible”; “to maximize my
earnings”); Max Rel (e.g., “to earn more than the other person”;
“to maximize the diﬀerence between the two persons in my
favor”); Fear (e.g., “did not trust the other person”; “to defend
myself against the other person”); Min Dif (e.g., “to minimize the
diﬀerence between both persons”; “to earn an equal amount”);
and Max Joint (e.g., “to earn as much as possible together”; “to
maximize the joint outcomes of both persons”). Participants rated
these choice reasons on 7-point scale (1 = not at all important,
7 = very important). The reliabilities for these ﬁve 4-item scales
ranged from 0.72 to 0.94.We averaged the four items in each scale
to create composite measures.
Perceived Strength of Competitive Norms
We assessed both the descriptive and injunctive aspect of
perceived competitive norms. To assess the strength of the
descriptive competitive norm (i.e., relating to which behaviors are
typically enacted), participants estimated the number of same-
side others (excluding themselves) who selected the competitive
choice (range = 0–2). To assess the strength of the injunctive
competitive norm (i.e., relating to which behaviors are typically
approved or disapproved), participants indicated which choice
they believed the same-side others wanted them to make (i.e., the
choice they would approve; 0 = cooperative, 1 = competitive).
Analysis Strategy
The experiment involved interaction between two participants,
arranged in pairs. Because participants within each pair
inﬂuenced each other’s responses, they cannot be treated as
independent observations. Accordingly, the unit of analysis was
the pair of interacting participants and we analyzed the average
response across participants within pairs. PDG choice behavior
was coded: 0 = cooperative, 1 = competitive. When averaged
across participants within pairs, this variable could assume the
values 0 (both participants cooperate), 0.5 (one cooperates and
one competes), and 1 (both compete). We followed the same
procedure for the manipulation checks (0 = no, 1 = yes) and
for participants’ estimate of the choice same-side others wanted
them to make (injunctive norm). This rendered these variables
amenable to analysis of variance (ANOVA).2
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
We present relevant means and standard deviations in Table 1.
As intended, an Accountability (public vs. private) × Interaction
2To demonstrate that the results for the dichotomous variables (i.e., manipulation
checks, competition, and injunctive norm) are not purely an artifact of our
preferred ANOVA strategy, we conducted alternative analyses, using SAS PROC
GLIMMIX. In these logistic analyses, the individual participants (rather than
interacting pairs) were treated as units of analysis. To control for the dependence
between participants within each pair, we included pairs as a random variable
in a multilevel model. We speciﬁed that the dependent variables have a binary
distribution. The pattern of signiﬁcant (and non-signiﬁcant) results was identical,
with one minor exception: the Accountability × Interaction Type interaction
on competition was signiﬁcant in the ANOVA (see below) and marginal in the
multilevel logistic analysis, χ2(1) = 2.97, p = 0.085.
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TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for
manipulation checks, competitive choice, choice reasons, and perceived
competitive norms as a function of accountability (public vs. private
responding) and interaction type (individuals vs. groups).
Public Private
Individuals Groups Individuals Groups
Manipulation checks (0–1)
Accountability check 0.74 (0.36) 0.86 (0.26) 0.19 (0.32) 0.17 (0.30)
Interaction-type
check
0.35 (0.42) 0.89 (0.21) 0.32 (0.42) 0.83 (0.30)
Competitive choice
(0–1)
0.14 (0.29) 0.50 (0.50) 0.17 (0.34) 0.26 (0.39)
Choice reasons (1–7)
Max Own 3.93 (0.95) 4.35 (0.92) 4.01 (0.86) 4.09 (0.88)
Max Rel 2.33 (0.88) 3.05 (1.34) 2.41 (0.86) 2.80 (0.99)
Fear 2.44 (0.94) 2.73 (0.99) 2.46 (1.07) 2.92 (1.30)
Min Dif 5.92 (0.94) 5.30 (1.12) 5.63 (1.24) 5.42 (1.02)
Max Joint 6.07 (1.01) 5.33 (1.16) 5.89 (1.08) 5.38 (1.28)
Perceived competitive norm
Descriptive norm
(0–2)
0.81 (0.49) 1.18 (0.48) 0.75 (0.47) 1.14 (0.64)
Injunctive norm (0–1) 0.14 (0.29) 0.55 (0.40) 0.22 (0.35) 0.50 (0.42)
Type (individuals vs. groups) ANOVA on the accountability
manipulation check revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
accountability only, F(1,133) = 136.57, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50.
Participants experienced stronger accountability with public
(compared to private) responding. Neither the interaction-type
main eﬀect [F(1,133) = 0.86, p = 0.357, η2p = 0.003] nor the
Accountability × Interaction Type interaction [F(1,133) = 1.85,
p = 0.177, η2p = 0.01] was signiﬁcant. As a check on the
interaction-type manipulation, we assessed perceived outcome
interdependence. As intended, an ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant
interaction-type main eﬀect, F(1,133) = 78.22, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.37. Participants perceivedmore outcome interdependence
in the intergroup (compared to interindividual) condition.
Neither the accountability main eﬀect [F(1,133) = 0.63,
p = 0.430, η2p = 0.003] nor the Accountability × Interaction
Type interaction [F(1,133) = 0.09, p = 0.761, η2p = 0.0004]
was signiﬁcant. In all, the accountability and interaction-type
manipulations were eﬀective.
Competitive Choice
An Accountability (public vs. private) × Interaction Type
(individuals vs. groups) ANOVA on competitive choice revealed
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of interaction type, F(1,133) = 11.83,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.08. Interactions between members of diﬀerent
groups were more competitive than interactions between
individuals (i.e., a discontinuity eﬀect). The accountability
main eﬀect was not signiﬁcant, F(1,133) = 2.59, p = 0.110,
η2p = 0.02. The numerical pattern was for participants
to be more competitive in the public (compared to
private) condition. Importantly, we obtained a signiﬁcant
Accountability × Interaction Type interaction, F(1,133) = 4.28,
p = 0.041, η2p = 0.03. Tests of simple eﬀects indicated that group
members were signiﬁcantly more competitive than individuals
in the public condition, F(1,133) = 14.64, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10,
but not in the private condition, F(1,133) = 0.97, p = 0.325, η2p
= 0.01. As hypothesized, the discontinuity eﬀect was stronger
with public than with private responding. Looked at in a diﬀerent
way, accountability signiﬁcantly increased competition in the
intergroup condition, F(1,133) = 6.72, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.04, but
not in the interindividual condition, F(1,133) = 0.11, p = 0.745,
η2p = 0.001.
Choice Reasons
A series of ANOVAs on the ﬁve choice reasons resulted
in signiﬁcant main eﬀects of interaction type on Max Rel,
F(1,133) = 9.82, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.07, Fear, F(1,133) = 4.13,
p = 0.044, η2p = 0.03, Max Joint, F(1,133) = 10.37, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.07, and Min Dif, F(1,133) = 4.87, p = 0.029, η2p
= 0.04. The interaction type eﬀect on Max Own was not
signiﬁcant, F(1,133) = 2.58, p = 0.111, η2p = 0.02. We present
relevant means and standard deviations in Table 1. Group
members (compared to individuals) were more concerned with
maximizing relative outcomes and feared their opponents more.
Individuals (compared to group members) were more concerned
with maximizing joint outcomes and minimizing the diﬀerence
in outcomes between sides. There were no other signiﬁcant
eﬀects.
Perceived Norms
An ANOVA on the estimated number of competitive choices by
same-side others (descriptive norm) revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of interaction type only, F(1,132) = 17.91, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.12. Participants in the intergroup (compared to
interindividual) condition estimated that a greater number
of same-side others would select the competitive choice (the
descriptive competitive norm; Table 1). An ANOVA on the
choice participants thought same-side others wanted them to
make (injunctive norm) also revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
interaction type only, F(1,133) = 29.47, p <0.001, η2p = 0.18.
Those in the intergroup (compared to interindividual) condition
estimated that a greater number of same-side others wanted them
to select the competitive choice (the injunctive competitive norm;
Table 1). Intergroup (compared to interindividual) interactions
rendered salient descriptive and injunctive competitive norms.
Conditional Process Analyses
Groupmembers (compared to individuals) scored higher onMax
Rel and Fear, and lower on Min Dif and Max Joint. Furthermore,
the (descriptive and injunctive) competitive norm was stronger
in the groups (compared to individuals) condition. Could any
of these potential mediating mechanisms shed light on why
the discontinuity eﬀect was stronger with public (compared
to private) responding? To address this question, we tested a
conditional process model that Edwards and Lambert (2007)
referred to as “direct eﬀect and second stage moderation model”
(see also, Baron and Kenny, 1986, p. 1179). In this model,
the moderator (accountability) aﬀects the magnitude of the
mediators’ (choice reasons, perceived competitive norm) partial
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FIGURE 1 | The conditional process model tested in this experiment.
association with the outcome (competition) and this is found
in conjunction with a main eﬀect of the independent variable
(interaction type) on the mediators (Figure 1). This model is
appropriate because interaction type inﬂuenced the potential
mediators, irrespective of accountability. Yet, interaction type
inﬂuenced competition only in the public condition. We
therefore tested the mediated eﬀects of interaction type on
competition, conditional upon accountability.
We ﬁrst examined whether the moderator (accountability)
aﬀected the magnitude of the mediators’ (choice reasons,
descriptive and injunctive competitive norms) associations with
the outcome (competition) by testing, for each mediator, the
Accountability × Mediator interaction. We present relevant
results in Table 2. These analyses revealed a signiﬁcant
Accountability × Injunctive Norm interaction eﬀect only
(Table 2, A × C). Strong (compared to weak) injunctive
competitive norms predicted increased competition in the public
condition, B = 0.53, SE = 0.13, F(1,131) = 16.60, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.10. In the private condition, the association between
strength of the injunctive competitive norm and competition
was not signiﬁcant, B = 0.19, SE = 0.11, F(1,131) = 2.73,
p = 0.101, η2p = 0.02. Furthermore, the previously signiﬁcant
Accountability × Interaction Type interaction on competition
(Table 2, A × B) became non-signiﬁcant when we controlled
for the Accountability × Injunctive Norm interaction. This
indicates that the Accountability × Interaction Type interaction
was “funneled through” the Accountability × Injunctive Norm
interaction (Baron and Kenny, 1986, p. 1179). Accountability did
not signiﬁcantly moderate the association of any other mediator
with competition (Table 2, A × C row).
As a ﬁnal step, we used the PROCESS macro to test
the conditional process model depicted in Figure 1, with
the injunctive competitive norm as mediator (model 15;
10,000 resamples; Hayes, 2013). PROCESS calculates bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals (CIs) for the indirect eﬀect (denoted as
ab) of interaction type on competition via a mediator (here,
injunctive competitive norm), conditional upon accountability.
In the public condition, this indirect eﬀect was positive and
signiﬁcant (i.e., the 95% CI did not include 0), ab = 0.18,
SE = 0.06, 95% CI = 0.08/0.32. In the private condition, this
indirect eﬀect was non-signiﬁcant, ab = 0.06, SE = 0.04, 95%
CI = −0.004/0.17. In all, the discontinuity eﬀect was mediated
by an injunctive competitive norm when accountability was
present (public condition) but not when it was absent (private
condition). That is, the intergroup (compared to interindividual)
context strengthened the injunctive competitive norm, and
accountability enforced this norm.3
DISCUSSION
According to the ingroup-favoring-norm explanation, the
discontinuity eﬀect arises in part because interindividual and
intergroup interactions are governed by diﬀerent norms or
moral codes (Wildschut and Insko, 2006, 2007). Whereas
interindividual interactions activate norms emphasizing
fairness and reciprocity, intergroup interactions are guided by
norms dictating ingroup-favoritism or parochialism. Because
accountability enforces norms (Tetlock, 1992), the ingroup-
favoring-norm explanation entails a larger discontinuity eﬀect
when accountability is present compared to when it is absent
(Hypothesis 1). Results supported this ﬁrst hypothesis. To
be precise, when participants were accountable to others
seated on their side of the laboratory (same-side others),
intergroup interactions were signiﬁcantly more competitive
than interindividual interactions (the discontinuity eﬀect). In
the absence of such accountability, the discontinuity eﬀect
was not signiﬁcant. This latter ﬁnding suggests that being part
of a three-person group that shares earnings (i.e., outcome
interdependence) per se may not be suﬃcient to induce the
discontinuity eﬀect. Although outcome interdependence renders
salient the injunctive ingroup-favoring norm, accountability is
required to enforce this norm.
Examining our ﬁndings from a diﬀerent angle, we found
that accountability increased intergroup competition, replicating
prior research in PDG (Wildschut et al., 2002; Pinter et al., 2007)
and bargaining (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993) contexts. Matters
were more complex in the interindividual context. Based on the
notion that interindividual interactions are guided by norms
of fairness and reciprocity (Cohen et al., 2010), we predicted
that accountability would reduce interindividual competition.
However, we also considered the alternative possibility that
accountability could enforce a norm of self-interest (Ratner
and Miller, 2001), thereby increasing competition. Results
revealed that accountability neither decreased nor increased
interindividual competition and, thus, neither prediction
received support. This null ﬁnding could indicate that both
predictions are correct and cancel-out each other. That is, in
interindividual contexts, accountability may enforce norms
3We also conducted a parallel mediation analysis, in which we included
simultaneously all six mediators for which the interaction type main eﬀect was
signiﬁcant (i.e., descriptive and injunctive competitive norm, Max Rel, Fear, Min
Dif, and Max Joint). In this analysis, the Accountability × Injunctive Norm
interaction remained signiﬁcant, F(1,120) = 4.19, p = 0.043. Accountability did
not signiﬁcantly moderate the partial association of any other mediator with
competition (ps > 0.076). In the parallel mediation analysis, the indirect eﬀect
of interaction type on competition via the injunctive competitive norm became
marginal in the public condition (ab = 0.08, SE = 0.05, 90% CI = 0.01/0.19) and
remained non-signiﬁcant in the private condition (ab = −0.03, SE = 0.04, 90%
CI = −0.09/0.03). We suspect that the slightly weaker evidence for the injunctive
norm in these parallel mediation analyses is due to the inclusion of multiple
correlated mediators and resultant multicollinearity.
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TABLE 2 | Conditional process analyses: testing the effect of accountabilty on the magnitude of the mediators’ association with competition (Effect
A × C).
Mediator
Max Rel Fear Min Dif Max Joint Descriptive
competitive norm
Injunctive
competitive norm
F p F p F P F p F p F p
Accountability (A) 4.90 0.029 3.87 0.051 4.87 0.029 5.95 0.016 2.30 0.132 3.33 0.070
Interaction type (B) 2.36 0.127 7.94 0.006 6.22 0.014 2.42 0.122 4.11 0.045 1.79 0.183
A × B 3.18 0.077 5.40 0.022 2.38 0.126 3.04 0.084 4.12 0.045 0.62 0.434
Mediator (C) 29.75 <0.001 21.48 <0.001 56.00 <0.001 106.07 <0.001 13.28 <0.001 17.25 <0.001
A × C 0.01 0.903 0.08 0.773 0.67 0.416 2.13 0.146 0.00 0.972 3.92 0.049
The dependent variable in each analysis is competitive choice. Denominator degrees of freedom equal 131. For analyses involving the descriptive competitive norm,
denominator degrees of freedom equal 130 due to one missing value.
of fairness and equality, as well as the opposing norm of self-
interest. This is what McDougall (1920, p. 79) may have had in
mind when he wrote that, in the absence of a “group spirit,” the
“egoistic and the altruistic tendencies of each man’s nature [are
in] in perpetual conﬂict.” Future research could examine how
diﬀerent individuals weigh these contrasting tendencies. Perhaps
the norm of self-interest is more salient to high-narcissists,
who value agency over communion, whereas norms of fairness
and reciprocity are more salient to low-narcissists, who value
communion over agency (Horton and Sedikides, 2009; Hart
et al., 2011). If so, accountability should increase interindividual
competition among high-narcissists but reduce it among
low-narcissists.
Another possible explanation for the absence of a signiﬁcant
accountability eﬀect in the interindividual context is that
the accountability manipulation was less impactful there.
The manipulation check data indicate that, regardless of
interaction type, participants in the public (compared to private)
condition expected their decisions to be identiﬁed by own-side
others. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
accountability manipulation had less impact on the subjective
sense of accountability to own-side others in the interindividual
(compared to intergroup) context. This is an important issue to
consider in future research.
The conditional process analyses shed additional light on
the role of accountability in interindividual and intergroup
contexts. We hypothesized that an intergroup (compared to
interindividual) context would render salient the ingroup-
favoring norm, and that accountability would enhance the
impact of this norm on competitive behavior (Hypothesis 2).
Supporting this second hypothesis, participants in the intergroup
(compared to interindividual) condition estimated that a greater
number of same-side others would select the competitive choice
(the descriptive competitive norm) and wanted them to select
the competitive choice (the injunctive competitive norm). In
addition, accountability strengthened the positive association
between the injunctive (but not descriptive) competitive norm
and competitive behavior. As a result, the discontinuity eﬀect was
mediated by an injunctive competitive norm when accountability
was present but not when it was absent. The ﬁnding that
accountability enforced injunctive norms only is consistent with
the idea that (a) injunctive (but not descriptive) norms relate to
how behaviors are typically approved or disapproved (Cialdini
et al., 1990) and (b) only when group members are accountable
can their actions inﬂuence how they are evaluated by the ingroup
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).
The conditional process analyses yielded no evidence that
accountability bolstered the link between choice reasons and
actual choice. Group members reported more concern with
maximizing relative outcomes and fear than did individuals.
Concern for maximizing relative outcomes and fear, in turn,
predicted increased competition irrespective of accountability.
Individuals reported more concern with maximizing joint
outcomes and minimizing diﬀerences than did group members.
In turn, concern for maximizing joint outcomes and minimizing
diﬀerences predicted reduced competition irrespective of
accountability (Table 2). Note that, even in the public condition,
participants’ stated choice reasons remained private. We think it
is plausible that accountability would strengthen the association
between publicly stated choice reasons and behavior because
(a) actors whose publicly stated reasons are inconsistent with
their behavior (e.g., stating that one wishes to maximize joint
outcomes but selecting a competitive choice) would be seen as
hypocritical (Barden et al., 2005; Alicke et al., 2013) and (b)
such consistency (vs. inconsistency) can only be assessed when
accountability is present (i.e., in the public condition). This is
another avenue for future research.
Broader Implications
Although these ﬁndings provide evidence for the postulated
ingroup-favoring norm, one could argue that when a person
inﬂuences the welfare of other groupmembers and is accountable
to them, it is simply rational to take their interests into account
to gain their approval and avoid sanctions. Relevant to this
point, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) proposed that norms arise
from rationality. They illustrated this idea with an example of
a husband and wife who like to go out together on weekends.
Unfortunately, the wife prefers to go dancing, whereas the
husband prefers to go to the movies. Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
suggested that the couple can resolve this conﬂict of interest and
maximize joint outcomes over time by alternating between jointly
going to the movies on 1 weekend and jointly going dancing on
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the next weekend. What is a rational solution at ﬁrst may then
become normative over time, and hence, rationality and norms
may become confounded. Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) general
argument is compatible with Bentham’s (1789/1879) and Mill’s
(1863) concept of utilitarianism—that norms arise from what is
the greatest good for the greatest number.
The concept of an ingroup-favoring norm may also shed light
on the question of how individual preferences are combined to
reach group decisions. Using a social decision scheme approach,
Morgan and Tindale (2002) examined social inﬂuence processes
within three-person groups by asking group members to make
individual PDG choices before engaging in a discussion to
reach consensus regarding a group decision. They found that
when the individual preferences indicated unanimity among the
three group members, the ﬁnal group decision almost always
corresponded to these individual preferences. When the group
members’ individual decisions were not unanimous, however, an
interesting asymmetry occurred. Whereas a competitive group
decision was reached in 91% of cases when all but one group
member had initially indicated a competitive preference, a
cooperative group choice was only reached in 48% of cases when
all but one group member had initially indicated a cooperative
preference. That is, whereas majorities favoring competition
were rarely persuaded to change their view, majorities favoring
cooperation were persuaded to change their view in most
cases. Morgan and Tindale (2002, p. 49) interpreted these
asymmetric social inﬂuence patterns in terms of shared task
representations or “any task/situation relevant concept, norm,
perspective, processing goal, or strategy that is shared by most or
all of the group members.” They proposed that when arguments
are stated that are consistent with a shared task representation,
even majority members can be inﬂuenced to change their initial
position. We think that the ingroup-favoring norm is central
to group members’ shared task representation when there is a
conﬂict of interest with an out-group.
Limitations and Future Directions
Before generalizing from these ﬁndings, it is important to keep
in mind that the sample consisted exclusively of Western,
female undergraduates. The question whether culture has
a bearing on the role of accountability in interindividual
and intergroup contexts presents a fruitful direction for
future research. A primary dimension on which cultures
and their members can be diﬀerentiated is individualism-
collectivism (Hofstede, 1980). In individualistic cultures (such
as the UK, where we conducted the present experiment), the
independent, agentic self predominates. In collectivist cultures,
the interdependent, communal self predominates (Triandis,
1989). Gelfand and Realo (1999) showed that, in the context
of intergroup bargaining, accountability increased competition
between group representatives with low levels of collectivism (as
in the present experiment with UK participants) but increased
cooperation between those with high levels of collectivism.
Their ﬁndings suggest that the catalytic eﬀect of accountability
on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity may be stronger in
individualistic than collectivistic cultures.
Nonetheless, there are important diﬀerences between the
PDG and the tasks employed by Gelfand and Realo (1999).
They investigated a combination of distributive (i.e., zero-sum)
and integrative bargaining scenarios. Schopler et al. (2001)
proposed that, in zero-sum situations, there is no one choice
that beneﬁts both players. Because this is true for interactions
between groups and interactions between individuals, there is no
reason to expect a discontinuity eﬀect in a distributive bargaining
context. They further noted that, when an integrative solution
is available, mutual cooperation beneﬁts both players more than
mutual competition. Because this is true for relations between
groups and relations between individuals, there is no reason
to expect a discontinuity eﬀect in an integrative bargaining
context either. Consistent with these arguments, Schopler et al.
(2001) demonstrated that the discontinuity eﬀect arises when,
as in the PDG, mutual cooperation beneﬁts both players
whereas competition beneﬁts one player over the other (also
see Wildschut et al., 2003). Whether Gelfand and Realo’s (1999)
evidence for the moderating role of individualism-collectivism
generalizes to a PDG context is an important question for future
research.
Finally, we recruited exclusively female participants because
(a) we decided to limit our experiment to same-gender
interactions (to eliminate gender composition of experimental
sessions as a source of random error) and (b) females vastly
outnumber males in our participant pool (∼8:1). To the
best of our knowledge, there is no systematic evidence to
suggest that gender moderates the eﬀect of accountability in
either interindividual or intergroup contexts. Nonetheless, future
research on this topic would do well to study both males and
females.
Coda
The present ﬁndings add to our understanding of why
intergroup relations are often more antagonistic and violent
than are interindividual relations: accountability enforces
parochialism in intergroup contexts. We hope that these
and other advances will provide a basis for eﬀective
interventions aimed at promoting intergroup cooperation and
harmony.
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